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IN THE SUPRFME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
, l:'TE CJ!, UTAH, 
i'' 1 .1 ir1 Liff/ Respondent 
rAIJL Bl\I \N TUCKER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19281 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) in the Third 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Paul Brian Tucker, was convicted in a 
trial by jury of Aggravated Robbery on May 10, 1983. Appellant 
11as sentenced to the indeterminate term of not less than five (5) 
··1ears to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction or, in the 
:ilt,r1::itivec d new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I.Jn Februarv 18, 1983, a man was robbed at gunpoint by 
,,·•11e1inc' '""citing a bandana over his face, near the Little America 
Motel located at 500 South and Main Street in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Shortly after the robbery, two deputv sheriffs from Salt 
Lake County were driving down 500 South when they observed a 
person run out in front of their patrol vehicle (T.98). The 
deputies observed this person run into some shrubbery near 
the motel and then exit the shurbbery and run across the street, 
into an alleyway, out of their view (T.52). 
The same person who was observed by the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff deputies was also observed by a Salt Lake City Police 
vice officer who happened by at the same time. This vice 
officer, who was just coming off duty (T.85), pursued the person 
on foot down the alleyway, but the officer quickly lost all 
contact with the fleeing person (T.88). At all times the officer 
were pursuing this individual, they were unaware of the robbery 
which had taken place. 
A short time after the Salt Lake City vice officer had las 
sight of the person who fled into the alleyway, he came across 
appellant lying in a vacant field which is adjacent to the 451 
Club, a tavern located in the area (T.90). 
After learning of the robbery, the police took the victim 
of the robbery and his companion to the field where they had 
arrested the appellant. The appellant was handcuffed and 
surrounded by uniformed police officers, and it was at this 
point that the victim and his companion identified the appellant 
as the perpetrator of the robbery (T.12,27). 
The appellant was searched pursuant to this arrest and 
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- 11<!11 ;11 Jiscovering a common type bandana on his person, no 
,,, Ii"" W.JS found (T.22). 
11n 11, 1983, a line-up was conducted at the Salt 
I.ell-• 1;'' y Police station at which time the victim of the robbery 
p1<'1·,.,d thP appellant out of a group of eight men, as the 
of the robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY THE 
VICTIM OF THE ROBBERY WAS SUGGESTIVE AND 
INVOLVED A LIKLIHOOD OF MISIDENTIFICATION 
AND AS A RESULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
During the commission of the robbery the perpetrator had 
worn a bandana which covered most of his face (T.22) and the 
entire incident lasted approximately fifeen to twenty seconds 
(T.20). 
About twenty minutes after the robbery, the victim was 
transported by the police to the vacant lot where they had 
discovered the appellant lying in the field (T.27). At the time 
he was presented to the victim, the appellant was handcuffed and 
surrounded by uniformed police officers at which time the victim 
identified appellant as the man who had robbed him (T.27). 
The type of showup identification which was used in this 
c;ise is generally disfavored and has been widely condemned as 
;in inherently suggestive procedure. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S . 
. '93 (1%7), United States v. O'Connor, 282 F.Supp. 903 [D.C.]; 
409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
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In the Biggers case, the United States Supreme Court held 
that where there existed a "likelihood of misidentification," the 
defendant's due process right might be violated by admission by 
the court of that identification. Id. at 199. 
The inquiry, as outlined by the court in Biggers, is 
whether the eyewitness identification appears reliable as vieued 
under the totality of the circumstances applying the following 
five factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of 
attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description 
of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation; and, (5) the length of time 
the crime and the confrontation. 
Applying the factors to the present action, it becomes 
apparent that there exists a likelihood of misidentification. 
A. OPPORTUNITY OF THE WITNESS TO OBSERVE 
THE CRIMINAL. 
According to the victim's testimony the entire incident 
lasted only about fifteen to twenty seconds, occurred late at 
night, and the assailant had a bandana covering his face during 
the entire incident. 
B. DEGREE OF ATTENTION. 
Considering the nature of the crime, it would seem appareT 
that the victim's focus would be on the gun and an escape route. 
Indeed the victim's testimony reveals the following: 
Q. And I assume you had a gun pointed at you 
and that you were mostly focusing on the 
-4-
I I 
gun is that fair to say? I mean you 
saw this gun in front of you. 
''- That is the first thing you notice, yes. 
·rt 1hus appears that the victim's attention was on the gun 
d11r-i'"1g most uf the fifteen to twenty seconds of the robbery. 
C. ACCURACY OF PRIOR DESCRIPTION. 
This is perhaps the most telling of the factors in that 
the record is devoid of any such prior description. In fact, 
of the three officers that testified at trial, none had talked 
to the victim prior to the time of the tainted and suggestive 
showup. 
D. LEVEL OF CERTAINTY DEMONSTRATED BY THE 
WITNESS AT THE CONFRONTATION. 
During his examination the victim stated: "They took us 
I would say a block or so from the area where we were robbed to 
where there were a number of police cars and alot of lights and 
they had the fellow that robbed us standing there." (T.12). 
The above statement by the victim is susceptible of two 
readings: first as demonstrating a high level of certainty but, 
secondly, as showing the inherently suggestive nature of the 
shnw11p and the conclusion which is based thereon. The conclusion 
of the victim seems to be based, not on any articulated specific 
features of height, weight or coloring, but rather the conclusion 
anJ its certainty seem based on light, police cars andfue fact 
LILit the: .q.Jpellant stands handcuffed alone in a sea of uniformed 
,,_, L i_\_'C 
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E. THE LENGTH OF TIME BETHEEN THE CRIME 
AND THE CONFRONTATION. 
The testimony of the victim indicated approximately twent: 
minutes. 
It becomes apparent in applying the factors outlined in 
Biggers, supra, that the eyewitness identification in this case 
involves "a likelihood of misidentification." In the case of 
People v. Thomas, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 188 72 A.D.2d 910 (1979), the Ne1 
York Supreme Court Appellate Division, in a case with very simil, 
facts to the one before the court, stated that the defendant in 
that case had been denied due process under the law as a result 
of a suggestive showup, despite the fact that the showup was madE 
in the field and done shortly after the crime as a part of the 
investigation. Much like the present action, that case involved 
a victim who had a very limited opportunity to see the perpetra-
tor's face. That court, in reversing the defendant's conviction 
stated: 
The opportunity to view his assailants 
during the crime was very limited. Hence 
it was very important that his pretrial 
identification of his assailants not be 
the product of unnecessary suggestion, 
such as one on one viewing at the insist-
ence of the police. 
Id. at 190. See also People v. Dolphin, 77 A.D. 2d 571, 429 
N.Y.S. 2d 732 (1980). 
Should this court agree that appellant's due process 
rights were violated by this suggestive lineup, it should be 
noted that the subsequent lineup under finer conditions cannot 
remedy the defects. Prior to the lineup held one month after 
-6-
.a 
,,, c,ll(1\v11p the only time the victim had seen the appellant's 
1 "'' pi 11,i lo the lineup was the suggestive showup. If the 
I '1.-l: 
. l ... h,, ·1'1p ,,as indeed tainted, it seems inconsistent to hold 
<F< lie remedied by a lineup. 
Where a flawed pre-trial identification 
occurs, the state is not entitled to use 
:Jn in court identification with showing it 
is not tainted by the prior identification. 
Only a per se exclusionary rule can be an 
effective sanction to ensure that law 
enforcement authorities will respect the 
defendant's due process rights during pre-
trial identification procedures. 
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
In the case at bar, appellant's counsel moved to suppress 
the lineup as a result of the state's failure to lay proper 
foundation as to its fairness and reliability (T.16) which 
objection was overruled. Since the state has the burden of 
proving its reliability and the evidence shows that in fact it 
was made under circumstances which were unnecessarily suggestive 
and conducive to mistaken identification, appellant's due process 
rLghts as guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions 
were violated and a new trial should be granted. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF, AND REQUIRE-
tlENTS FOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
ThP Jefense raised at trial was that the appellant was not 
l he· pe rsuti \·Jho committed the aggravated robbery. As a part of his 
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defense appellant requested an instruction which described the 
dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence, the 
factors to be considered in assessing the value of identification 
evidence and the burden of proof with respect to that defense. 
The trial court refused to give the instructionl and exception 
was taken (T.110). 
The dangers involved with eyewitness identification 
evidence has been well documented in the literature, and numerous 
The instruction requested provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Identification testimony is an expression or belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe whether or not the defendan· 
was the person who robbed him. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, 
you should consider the following: 
1. Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
2. Are you satisfied that the identification made by the 
witness subsequent to the event was the product of his or her own 
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of 
the identification, and the circumstances under which the identi· 
fication was made. 
3. Has the witness ever failed to identify the defendant' 
4. Is the witness credible? Consider whether he is 
truthful, whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a 
reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the pros-
ecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this 
specificailly includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime, with which he stands charged. If after examining the 
tesimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the 
identification, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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J.,"1 1e·11e" articles have been written on the subject.2 
Tl1c i11struction which was offered by appellant in this case 
1 /,CJt framed by the United States Court of Appeal for the 
Districl of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire,3 409 F.2d 552 
(D C. Cir 1972). This instruction was cited with approval by 
--2--
Did Your E es Deceive You? Ex ert Ps cholo ical Testimon 
on the Unre ia i ity o Eyewitness I enti ication. 29 Stan.L. Rev, 
91)9 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of Eye-
witness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); 
£Yewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. 
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies,Shepherd, Experimental Studies 
of Face Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 
161 (1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender 
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology 
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness 
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 191; Buckhout, 
Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim. 
Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 
Scientific Arn., Dec. 1974 at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shepherd, Experi-
mental Studies of Face Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219 
(1977); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: 
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, 
Dimension in Eyewitness Identification, Crim. Def., 
May-June 1977 at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility 
Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976). 
3 
The Telf aire instruction specifically has either been 
recommended or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as 
relfected by the following cases: United States v. Holly, 402 F.2d 
273 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th 
Cir. 1975); State v. 363 A. 2d 162 (Conn., 1976); State 
v. Calia, 514 P.2d 1354 Or. App. 1973); cert. den. 417 U.S.9TT 
(1974): Commonwealth v. Rodri;uez, 391 N.E. 2d 889 (Mass. 1979); 
United States v. 5 2 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); 
State v. Dodge, 538 F.2 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den., 42·9 U.S. 
rogq-(1977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F-:zcr- Cir.) 
cc>n. den., 4L6U.S. 908 (1976); United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 
(6i:1\Cir. 1974), United States v. Fernandez, 269, 421 N.E. 2d 
157 (1981), State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 (W.Va. 1981); United 
v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980); People v. Guzman, 
121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380 (Cal. App. 1975); State v. 
l'otes, 215 s.r:. 2d 190 (S.C. 1975); State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 
ITJ\Jq- 1981); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Ut. 1982) (Stewart, 
.I issenting). State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1981). 
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Justice Stewart of this court in his dissent in State v. Malmrose 
649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) and has been examined by this court on 
numerous other occasions. State v. Reedy, Utah, No. 18082, filed 
April 26, 1984; State v. Newton, Utah, No. 19065, filed April 23, 
1984; State v. Melmrose, 649 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1982); State v. Shaffer 
638 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 
1980). 
The general conclusions that can be reached concerning this 
courts stand on the necessity of a Telfaire-type instruction seemo 
to be that under certain circumstances the identity instruction 
would be proper, but that in the cases which have come before the 
court there was no reversible error which could be found in the 
trial courts refusal to give the instruction. 
Appellant submits that the facts of this case dictate that 
some cautionary instruction should have been given. In this cour: 
latest pronouncement on the need for such an instruction State v. 
Reedy, supra, an analysis was outlined for determining the need 
for such an instruction: 
Id. at 5. 
The central question remains whether "under 
the totality of the circumstances the identi-
fication was reliable even though the confron-
tation procedure was suggestive," Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972). 
Factors evaluating the likelihood of misidenti-
fication include the opportunity of the witness 
to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 
the accuracy of the witness' prior description 
of the criminal, the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation. 
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As was seen in Point I of appellant's brief, the factors 
<rntlined in Biggers, supra, as applied to the present facts 
,,nnn:cly indicate that there exists a substantial chance of an 
1mreliable identification. 
Under the facts of Reedy, supra, as this court correctly 
observed that there was "independant testimony by a police officer 
of the defendants likeness to the photograph at the time of his 
initial arrest . [and] that the description given matched that 
of the defendant when initially identified and arrested." Id. at 
5,6. 
In the case at bar, there exists no independent testimony 
as to the identification, there was less than ample opportunity 
to observe by the victim, and perhaps most importantly the record 
is absent any description given by the victims prior to the 
appellant's arrest. It is hard to imagine a case where there 
could be a greater need for an instruction describing what eye-
witness testimony is, how it is to be evaluated and the burden of 
proof it must meet. 
Using the factors outlined by this court in Reedy, supra, 
there exists in this case a substantial likelihood that a mistaken 
identification was made. Appellant submits that the great need 
for a cautionary instruction combined with the trial court's 
refusal to give any such instruction, constitutes prejudicial 
error requiring a new trial. 
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POINT I II 
COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR ABOUT DEFENDANT'S 
CHOICE NOT TO TESTIFY VIOLATED DEFENDA:;T' S 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED PRIVILEGES AND 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In the landmark case of Griffin v. California, 350 U.S. 
609 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held that comments by a 
prosecutor about the failure of a criminal defendant to testify 
can effectively abridge the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to 
refuse to testify and, therefore, constitute reversible error. 
That court reasoned that a rule which would allow a prosecutor 
to comment "is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the 
state the privilege of tendering to the jury for its 
the failure of the accused to testify." Id. at 613. 
This court has expressly recognized the holding in Griffin 
supra, and stated: 
That a prosecutor has the duty and right 
to argue the case based on the total 
picture shown by the evidence or lack 
thereof, including reference to the paucity 
or absence of evidence adduced by the 
defense. But prosecutorial comment on a 
defendant's refusal to testify may violate 
a defendant's privilege against self 
incrimination. Trus a prosecutor commits 
constitutional error when his statement is 
manifestly intended or is of such character 
that a jury would naturally and necessarily 
contrue it to amount to a comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify. 
State v. Hales, 652 P. '.'d 1290 (Utah 1982); State v. Nomeland, 
581 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1978), State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
1977 Utah); State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). 
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During his closing argument in the trial, the prosecutor, 
;;,,>,,.n Stott of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, made the 
f,,l lu•.ving argument: 
MR. STOTT: She tells you that the reason 
the defendant was sweating, because a gun 
was pointed at him. She doesn't tell us 
why he was in the field hiding, does she? 
MS. CARTER (attorney for appellant): Your 
Honor, I am going to object to that. 
MR. STOTT: Also 
MS. CARTER: The defense has no burden to 
put on any evidence of anything. 
MR. STOTT: I didn't say what the defense 
was. I said she didn't say. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's complete this 
case. Let me make the statement, of course, 
that the burden is on the State to prove 
the case. The defendant does not have a 
burden of proving his innocence. 
MR. STOTT: Thank you. She didn't tell 
you, did she, why he was on that --
MS. CARTER: Your Honor, I am going to 
object. 
The COURT: Counsel. I would again admonish 
the jury and admonish you also that the State, 
the defendant does not have the responsibility 
of proving his innocence. The burden is on 
the State to prove the guilt. 
At which point, argument by Mr. Stott continued (T.108). 
Attorney for appellant following closing argument and out 
of the presence of the jury made a motion for a mistrial based 
on the prosecutor's comments. The motion was denied by the trial 
judge (T.109). 
In light of this courts pronouncements on permissible 
-13-
argument by a prosector in such a situation, the inquiry before 
the court should focus on whether the prosecutor's comrnents 
were "manifestly intended or of such a character that a jury 
would naturally and nessarily construe it as a comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify." State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 
1290 (Utah 1982). 
It takes no legal reasoning but mere commonsense to 
determine thatthe one and only thing the proseuctor was hoping 
to achieve by his persistant questions as to the defendant's 
counsel's failure to provide explanations was to plant in the 
jury's mind the question: Why didn't the defendant take the 
stand? If he is really innocent, why didn't he take the stand 
and tell us what he was doing in that field. 
A logical reading of the argument presented by Mr. Stott 
would indicate that it was both given by the prosecutor, and 
taken by the jury, as a comment on the failure of the accused 
to testify. As such, it is an impermissible comment on the 
appellant's absolute right not to testify or present any evidence. 
In light of the limited amount of evidence offered against 
the appellant in this case, it seems likely the jury might have 
relied on these impermissible comments in reaching its verdict. 
It is the possibility that these comments "could have affected" 
the outcome which require a reversal of the trial court's verdict 
State v. Wiswell,1639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
Independently, each of Points I, II and III constitute 
rP11cr,;ible error. However, it is important to note that the 
cr1mi1lative impact of such error clearly denied appellant a fair 
trial. The combination of the highly suggestive showup proceeding 
which was presented to the jury without any instruction or 
guidance and the improper conunent by the prosecutor or the 
appellant's constitutional right to remain silent has effective-
ly eviscerated appellant's right to a fundamentally fair trial. 
He therefore respectfully requests this court to reverse his 
conviction and grant him a new trial 
DATED <hi• L3""- day of lvn.." ' 1984. 
A. B SHAW 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
533 South Second East 
Sa t Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this -11._ day 
1984. 
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